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BOOK REVIEWS
Water Law and Administration
The Florida Experience
By
FRANK E. MALONEY, SHELDON J. PLAGER,
AND FLETCHER N. BALDWIN, JR.

Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968
Pp. xx, 488, price unknown
Until quite recently, water law was regarded as an esoteric appendage to a part of the curriculum everyone knew to be "narrow"
and "technical," certainly unfashionable and probably "irrelevant"
(except that "irrelevant" was not yet a word). Water law, in other
words, was a part of the (private) law of "Property," although
undoubtedly several generations of law students remained blissfully
unaware of its existence. True, Property, Wealth, Land, the McDougal and Haber call to arms, contained a chapter, "State and
Regional Planning: The Interdependences of Land and Water and
Rational Institutions."' So, for that matter, did its more orthodox
antidote, Cases and Text on Property by Casner and Leach. Not
unexpectedly, water law appeared here in Part XI, under "Rights
Incident to Ownership of Land;" Chapter 37-"Lateral and Subjacent Support;" Chapter 38-"Water Rights." But McDougal and
Haber was (or so we were told) "unteachable," and who ever
reached-or seriously strove to reach-pages one thousand two
hundred and thirty-seven to one thousand two hundred and seventynine of Casner and Leach? Conceivably, someone "out West" was
offering a seminar or even a course in water law 3-water was
rumored to be a problem in those far off parts. But the eastern
schools paid scant heed to the nation's problems of developing,
allocating, distributing and maintaining its water resources.
The literature accurately mirrored the general eastern attitude:
even small law libraries could hardly have been taxed by efforts to
accommodate scholarly work devoted to water resources problems
1. M. McDougal & D. Haber, Property, Wealth, Land (1948).
2. A. Casner & W. Leach, Cases and Text on Property (1959).
3. Some, like Dean Trelease, even wrote casebooks. F. Trelease, Water Law
(1967). There were and are others: J. Beuscher, Water Rights (1967) (the first "nonwestern" casebook) ; C. Martz, Cases on Natural Resource Law (1951) and, most
recently, J. Sax, Water Law, Planning and Policy (1968) (a stimulating and in many
ways fascinating "non-casebook").
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east of the 98th meridian. 4 There were a few notable exceptions.
One of them, The Law of Water Allocation in the Eastern United
States, 5 grew out of a 1956 symposium held in Washington, D.C.
sponsored by the Conservation Foundation. Surely not coincidentally, Professor Haber was its senior editor. Perhaps The Law of
Water Allocation in the Eastern United States was less an exception
than a harbinger: the next decade saw a phenomenal growth in interest in eastern water law. It also saw eastern states turn increasingly to their legislatures for "modifications" of common law doctrines which more and more revealed their inadequacy in coping with
the demands of an industrialized society.6 Interestingly enough, the
tide of legislative and scholarly activity has not broken the wall of
indifference in the "big" eastern law schools-or so one must conclude from their curricula. What initiative there is has come from
the state law schools as well as the smaller eastern and midwestern
institutions, although none apparently has gone as far as Iowa and
Buffalo where "Resource Planning" and "Environmental Management," respectively, are required first-year courses. 7 Perhaps the
predominant role of these institutions is accidental, perhaps it is
4. For purposes of water law the continental United States is divided into the
"East," meaning the 31 contiguous states that lie wholly east of the 98th meridian, and
the "West," meaning the remaining 17 states. Generally speaking, the East follows
the riparian system, the West the system of prior appropriation. See 1 Waters and
Water Rights § 15.5 (Clark ed. 1967).
5. The Law of Water Allocation in the Eastern United States (Haber & Bergen
eds. 1958).
6. The most comprehensive regulatory scheme was adopted by Iowa. A first-rate
examination of it can be found in Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Io'wa
Water Permit System (pts. 1-2), 7 Natural Resources J. 499 (1967), 8 Natural Resources J. 23 (1968). In very general terms, eastern regulatory schemes can be divided
into compulsory and permissive schemes and into schemes of general application
throughout the state and those limited to "critical" areas. For a more detailed discussion see e.g., Ellis, Some Current and Proposed Water-Rights Legislation in the
Eastern States, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 237 (1956); Heath, Water Management Legislation
in the Eastern States, 2 Land & Water L. Rev. 99 (1967).
In 1958, the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a Model
Water Use Act drafted by the Legislative Research Center of the University of Michigan Law School. See Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan Law School,
Water Resources and the Law (Pierce ed. 1958) for an analysis of the Act as well as
other valuable essays on water law problems. Obviously, any legislative tampering
with the existing system of water rights raises constitutional questions. For a thorough
exploration see Fisher, Due Process and the Effect of Eastern Appropriation Proposals
on Existing Rights, 'with Special Emphasis on the Michigan Proposal, in The Law of
Water Allocation in the Eastern United States 441 (Haber & Bergen eds. 1958).
7. This is not to say that substantial attention is necessarily paid to water resources
problems. According to Professor Tarlock, a survey of law school catalogues for 19681970 shows 46 courses concerned exclusively or substantially with water law. Most are
in western law schools, the major state universities and smaller eastern and midwestern
schools. Tarlock, Current Developments in Legal Education in the Development of a
Curriculum in Environmental Management, September 11-12, 1969 (unpublished paper
delivered at the Conference on Law and the Environment, Warrenton, Va.).
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symptomatic. It has, in any event, been furthered by the federal
government. Concern over the nation's water resources and concern
over the anemic state of the art of water-related research and training in all fields led Congress to enact the Water Resources Act of
1964.8 The Act sought to duplicate a page of American history: its
model was the agricultural extension service of the land grant colleges; consequently, it called for the establishment at land grant
colleges of Water Resources Research Institutes to initiate, support
(in whole or in part) and administer research, especially research
of a kind which would include or necessarily lead to the training
and teaching of graduate students. At this writing, the "legal" part
of the federal program has resulted in a series of publications addressed to various aspects or, in some cases, the entire system of
water law in a number of states.
Water Law and Administration-The FloridaExperience' is the
most ambitious legal publication yet to emerge under the aegis of
the Office of Water Resources Research." This handsome volume
is the fruit of a three-year collaboration between Dean Maloney and
Professors Plager and Baldwin. Dean Maloney and Professor
Plager brought a very special expertise to their task. Dean Maloney
had served as chairman of the Water Law Committee of the
Florida Water Resources Commission and later became Commission
counsel; Professor Plager had been Committee research assistant and
had served as special counsel to the Department of Water Resources
from 1960 to 1961. Together, Dean Maloney and Professor Plager
apparently bore the burden of the Florida part of this study; prime
responsibility for the federal part seems to have rested on Professor Baldwin. The end result is not free from ambiguity. As the
title hints, the authors appear to have intended something more than
a careful and comprehensive study of Florida water law. Rather,
without ever saying so in so many words, the book frequently comes
across as a (substantial) stab at an eastern water law treatise. As
some of us know, the road to water law treatises is fraught with
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1964).
9. E.g., R. Haik, W. Walton & D. Hills, Aspects of Water Resources Law (1969)
M. Lugar, Water Law in West Virginia (1963); R. Reis, Connecticut Water Law:

Judicial Allocation of Water Resources (1967); D. Tarlock, Evaluation of the Legal
Institutions of Diversion, Transfer, Storage, and Distribution of Water in Kentucky
(1968) ; Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 Rutgers L. Rev. 621 (1968);
Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Interregional Water Diversions, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
1299 (1968).

10. F. Maloney, S. Plager & F. Baldwin, Water Law and Administration-The
Florida Experience (1968) [hereinafter cited as Maloney].
11. Financial support for the study apparently also came from the Florida Board of
Conservation. Id. at vi.
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dangers 2 and in the reviewer's opinion, the authors of Water Law
and Administration-The Florida Experience have not avoided all
of them. The final verdict is that the parts are greater than the
whole. That is, the book does a fine job with the more limited task
of compiling and analyzing Florida law; it is flawed where it goes
substantially beyond those limits.
It may be well to turn first to the "successful" part. The authors'
plan after an introductory chapter calls for an exploration of the
"traditional problems and doctrines of the riparian system;' 13 a
shifting of focus along "functional lines" to consumptive uses; 14 a
consideration of eastern statutory modifications of common law
doctrines, with special attention given to relevant portions of the
Florida Water Resources Law of 1957 ;15 a discussion of rights in
diffused surface waters; 16 a "detailed examination" of appropriate
Florida governmental agencies ;17 and a look at water management
at the district and local levels.'" The authors devote a separate
chapter each to ownership (and rights) in "submerged bottoms"
underlying navigable waters and to pollution control. 9 The last
chapter, finally, outlines, in the authors' words, "some of the anticipated problems that are likely to arise as a result of future population growth and increasing demands on a limited although presently
'20
adequate fresh-water supply."
The introductory chapter is a rich and valuable one. After the
obligatory bow to critics of the legal system for its categorization
of water in disregard of the hydrologic cycle, the authors move
swiftly to paint a picture of Florida's "water facts" and quantitative
needs. The discussion is interesting, informative and though brief,
thorough. It serves well to place the subsequent legal analysis into a
framework and is illuminating to one who, having perused the table
of contents, wonders at the meager place allotted to surface stream
and lake water diversion problems: Florida's principal supply for
2
its consumptive needs comes from its vast ground water reservoirs.
12. See Meyers, Book Review, 77 Yale L.J. 1036 (1968).

13. Maloney, supra note 10, at chs. 2-4.
14. Id. at ch. 5.
15. Id. at ch. 6.

16. Id. at ch. 7.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at ch. 9.
at ch. 10.
at chs. 11, 12.
at 27, 28.

21. Id. at 14; ch. 5 at 141. The factual information in Chapter 1 is amply supplemented by a series of appendices giving, in this order, a summary of water use in
Florida, 1965 (App. A) ; Major Florida Waterbodies (App. B) ; Meandered Florida
Lakes (App. C) ; Corps of Engineers Activity in Florida (App. D) ; Applications

Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Location and Status (App. E) ; and Rules
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On the other hand, this reviewer has two quarrels with Chapter
2, "Rights in Defined Waterbodies-Basic Considerations." First:
As "a matter of writer's choice," 2 2 the authors limit the term "riparian rights" to rights in navigable bodies of water. This leads
them to claim an importance for the distinction between "navigable"
and "nonnavigable" which simply does not exist in anywhere near
the dimension asserted for it.2 3 Navigable or nonnavigable determines, roughly, whether private, state-created rights are compensable
vis-A-vis an exercise of either the federal or state "servitude." That
is, it determines whether private owners are subject to overriding
public rights in "navigation. '2 4 But the distinction has had little, if
any, impact on the relative rights of upland owners among themselves. 25 For that matter, the authors repeatedly admit that the
incidents attached to "riparian rights" are "quite similar ' 26 to those
attached to rights in nonnavigable waters, if indeed they are not the
same, as is "generally true with regard to consumptive use of
water.1 27 It becomes difficult, then, to agree that the distinction "is
perhaps the most important . . . in he law of water rights, 29' 28 and
no worthwhile purpose seems to be served by clinging to it.
of State Board of Health: Chapter 170C-5, Pollution of Waters (containing a classification of water basins) (App. F).
22. Id. at 32.
23. The distinction drawn is that "riparian rights" are usufructuary rights only,
whereas in nonnavigable waterbodies, the water itself is subject to private ownership.
Id. at 35.
24. The federal servitude has last been examined in detail by Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation, 48 Ore. L. Rev. 1 (1968). See Colberg, Inc. v.
State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432, P.2d 3, 62 cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949
(1968) for the most recent case involving the state servitude. The word "roughly" is
used because the federal government, at least, can destroy (without compensation) private rights in nonnavigable waters as well, provided it exercises its "superior" right
expressly. See Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power
and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural Resources J.1, 62-3 (1963).
25. New Jersey may be the exception that proves the rule. New Jersey still uses a
tidal-nontidal distinction rather than the navigable-nonnavigable one. It also claims a
proprietary right in tidal streams and has denied "riparian" status to one bordering a
tidal stream (or a tidal stretch) even in a controversy with upstream private owners.
See Attorney General v. Mayor of Paterson, 58 N.J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749 (Ch. 1889)
rev'd, 60 N. J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (E.&A. 1900).
26. Maloney, supra note 10, at 35.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. In one instance, this distinction leads the authors to what can only be called a
distortion of a case. McCord v. Big Brothers Movement, Inc., 120 N.J. Eq. 446, 185 A.
480 (Ch. 1936) is described in these words: "the New Jersey court found it unreasonable to use water from a small nonnavigable stream to provide swimming in an adjacent pond for boys in groups of seventy." Id. at 54 n.123. The author has shown elsewhere that McCord was a strict (and probably unreasonable) application of the New
Jersey rule against diverting and transporting water. There is nothing in the opinion to
suggest it turned on the nonnavigability of the stream. For that matter, the court relied
heavily on McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489 (E.&A.
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The second quarrel is over the use of western cases for allegedly
generally applicable propositions. 30 This seems dangerous and misleading business, unless the reader clearly understands the fundamental differences between the eastern and western systems, sometake up until Chapter 6 and then only
thing this book does not
31
briefly and superficially.
In Chapter 3, "Ownership of Upland as the Source of Riparian
Rights," one is struck by the clear, careful and readable treatment of
a perennial pain, namely, problems of description and platted streets.
For the most part, the discussion concentrates on Florida law and,
in this reader's opinion, gains tremendously by that concentration.
Essentially the same observation-that the book gains whenever
it concentrates on Florida-could be made about Chapter 4, "Nonconsumptive Uses of Natural Navigable Waterbodies." The nub of
the chapter deals with the rights of both riparians and the public to
access and navigation, fishing and swimming, an apparently unique
Florida "right to view" and wharfing and filling, the latter problems
clearly of great magnitude in that state. The discussion is, for the
most part, distinguished by a careful, case by case treatment of Florida case law. This is worth commenting on for two reasons: it is not a
practice uniformly pursued throughout the book and yet it is a practice
which adds interest and value. Perhaps the authors feared that the
utility of the book would be impaired by too much detailed, "untreatise-like" analysis of individual cases and perhaps they are right,
if the goal was indeed to produce a treatise. If it was to produce
primarily a study of Florida law, a good case can be made against
the more summary treatise style, namely, that it can distort the
volume and kind of authority which exists on any given point and
obscure the grey and ambiguous areas. A fuller presentation of the
cases (and especially, of course, greater emphasis on the facts)
would tend to leave the reader freer to come to his own conclusions
about "the law."
The title of Chapter 5, "Consumptive Use of Water: Common
Law Rules," is something of a misnomer. Quite properly, given
Florida's "water facts," the chapter is almost completely devoted to
1906), aff'd on other grounds, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) involving the navigable Passaic
River. See Hanks, The La'w of Water in New Jersey, 22 Rutgers L. Rev. 621, 663-66
(1968).
30. See e.g., Maloney, note 10 supra, at 32 n.5, citing a California case for the
nature of a riparian right. An even more serious example occurs in Chapter 6, § 63,
where the authors again use California to discuss "riparian land," Id. at 191 n.155,
without mentioning that California courts have good reason to define riparian land as
niggardly as possible, namely, to cut down riparian rights and thus mitigate the
tensions of having a dual system of water rights.
31. Id. § 65, at 193.
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ground water problems.3 2 It contains a short but first-rate description
of ground water hydrology and geology, and a fine physical explanation of the three main conflict areas: interference between wells;
aquifer overdrafts; and contamination, including salt water intrusion. 3 The "legal" discussion follows more familiar paths. It sets
out the "underground stream" or "percolating waters" classification
and deals briefly and unsuccessfully, it appears to me, with the significance of the classification. The lack of success is attributable to
statements like "It is generally agreed that the riparian and prior
appropriation doctrines governing surface watercourses are equally
applicable to subterranean streams. .

.

. "s

when neither riparian

let alone prior appropriation stream doctrines have been explained. 5 There is an equally off-hand and, for the average lawyer,
equally as unenlightening reference to the California ground water
doctrine of correlative rights. The authors are more careful, and
thus more successful, in comparing the percolating water reasonable
use rule with the surface watercourse reasonable use rule. However,
their statement that "a number of eastern courts have abandoned
the special reasonable use rule for percolating water and have specifically adopted a . . .rule . . . that is similar to the reasonable

use rule governing riparian rights in surface streams ' 3 6 sounds just
a bit too assured, considering that the authority for this proposition
is made up of four cases, one of them a 1908 Minnesota case and
another a 1963 Delaware chancery court decision. One of the banes
of eastern water law is its uncertainty, an uncertainty deriving at
least in part from the relative paucity of litigation (and thus law),
especially since the early part of the century. No one is really served
by advancing with too much assurance as general rules what may be
no more than judicial cries in the wilderness.
One final comment to this chapter: in dealing with the consumptive use of diffused surface waters, the authors chart what they call
"Modern Developments. ' 3 7 It is a fine summary of problems to
come, and one wishes we had been treated more often to such a
bird's eye view of the future.
Chapter 6 acquaints the reader with "Statutory Modifications of
Eastern Consumptive Use Doctrines." It is a short chapter, largely
32. §§ 51-54, at 141-61, deal with ground water; § 55, at 162-64, deals with springs;
§ 56, at 164-66, with defined surface waterbodies; and § 57, at 167-71, with diffused
surface water.
33. However, the general area of pollution, including ground water pollution, is
deferred until Chapter 11.
34. Id. at 152.
35. Nor is the difference explained in § 54, as promised in § 53.5.
36. Id. at 157.
37. Id. § 57.3.
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expository, and as such serves its purposes well-to provide a thumbnail sketch of compulsory and permissive permit systems in general
and a somewhat closer look at the Florida laws.18 However, the
authors also touch on several matters which could have benefited
by more attentive treatment. Thus the examination of "The Constitutional Problems in Regulating Withdrawals""9 lacks sufficient
emphasis on the East-West differences which make western courts
far more hostile to riparian rights (and hence far more receptive to
their statutory curtailment) than eastern courts may turn out to be.
Both the discussion of the "Advantages Inherent in Eastern Permit
Systems ' 40 and the comparison to "Western Consumptive Use Regu' suffer from a more basic flaw: the authors have apparently
lations 41
accepted the characterization of the western (appropriation) system
as an "inflexible" one which "freezes" specific quantities of water
because it grants the right to their use in perpetuity and thus "prevents more effective use by subsequent landowners. '42 This is contrasted-unfavorably-to the Iowa scheme which limits permits to
a maximum of ten years. Yet as its ablest student reminds us, Iowa's
system has never been put to the test because it "had its infancy
blessed with nearly a decade of relatively abundant water supplies. ' 43 Nor do we know whether the ten year limitation has had a
chilling effect on potential investors. Furthermore, relatively free
transferability of western rights no doubt mitigates their supposed
"inflexibility." 4 The authors' case would have gained persuasiveness
had these considerations been dealt with more carefully. Finally, this
reader is not sanguine about the assertion that it "would appear desirable to give the administrative authorities broad emergency
power [in times of drought] to suspend permits and apportion the
water among all the users rather than allowing the senior appropriator to take his entire amount while the junior gets nothing. ' 45 One
need not question whether it makes sense to speak of senior and
junior appropriators in a system which would give the senior the
"right" to share with the juniors in times of plenty-and in times of
38. The author is not altogether clear, though, why the "Use of Water Beyond
Riparian or Overlying Land" is dealt with in this chapter. See § 63.
39. Id. § 61.
40. Id. § 64.
41. Id. § 65.
42. Id. at 195.
43. Id. at 177, quoting from Hines, J Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water
PermitSystem, 8 Natural Resources J. 23, 27 (1968).
44. Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 301 (1957), is highly recommended reading.
45. Maloney, supra note 10, at 195.
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drought. The issue is: how many appropriators, senior or junior,
would such a system produce?
Chapter 7 is devoted to "Rights in Disposal of Diffused Surface
Water." It first deals briefly with the irksome question of distinguishing diffused surface water from such things as lakes, ponds,
marshes and swamps. It then proceeds to a short description and
comparison of the civil and common enemy rules, takes note of the
reasonable use rule, 46 and turns next to an analysis of Florida's position and its application of the rules. The chapter is rounded out by a
discussion of remedies and defenses.
Chapter 9 is a description and analysis of Florida's major (state)
agencies responsible for water resources administration. Understandably, the Division of Beaches and Shores is accorded a prominent place; so is the Division of Waterways Development and the
Cross-Florida Barge Canal Project. The discussion is lucid and
informative; it is also factual enough to make Florida's very special
problems come alive even for the distant reader. Much the same can
be said of Chapter 10, "Single Purpose and Multipurpose Water
Management Districts," made especially valuable by the critical
comments woven into the texture of the discussion.
The story told in Chapter 11, "The Law and Administration of
Pollution Control in Florida" is, unfortunately, the old familiar
one: too little too late. One can only cheer the authors' repeated and
forceful emphasis on the futility of even the most ideally structured
pollution control machinery unless it has the financial underpinnings
required for effective enforcement. Here, too, apparently, Florida's
story is typical.4" What is true of the states is also, as the authors
remind us, true of the federal government.4" To those who fear
growing federal dominance of water resources management and
especially pollution control, the book sounds a warning note: if the
states will not provide both the tools and the financial support, it is
"inevitable" 5 ° that federal power will replace state power.
46. One wishes, though, that the authors had not simply repeated the old criticism of
the civil law rule, namely, that it tends to inhibit development and improvement of
land, Id. at 202; whether it does so or not depends on where we focus, i.e., on the upper
or on the lower owner. See Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 Rutgers L.
Rev. 621, 691 (1968).
47. See, e.g., Maloney, supra note 10 at 100.4, "Critique of Single Purpose Drainage
by County and District."
48. Thus the authors recount a serious industrial pollution incident ultimately
blamed on inadequate financing of the Board of Health and the resulting lack of inspectors. Id. § 111.2(b), at 319.
49. And see this headline in the New York Times, Oct. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 7: "House
Limits Funds For Clean Water."
50. And as I read the authors, should be inevitable for large interstate and multistate problems. Maloney, supra note 10, at 345.

APRIL 1970]

BOOK REVIEWS

'Of all the difficult questions which have arisen in the application
of the law involving water rights, there is none which has produced
more uncertainty, caused greater conflict of opinion or produced more
diverse results than that relating to the title of the land under the
waters.' The truth of this quotation is nowhere more apparent than in
Florida where the already confused common law is further complicated by old Spanish law, numerous statutes, and the activities of
various administrative agencies. The result is a body of law which
requires lengthy explanation and, even then, defies any real degree of
certainty.51
Thus the authors introduce their last substantive chapter, "Title
to Beds Under Navigable Waters." In this reader's opinion, it is
easily the most impressive single chapter in the book. A number
of factors underlie this judgment. The chapter begins with an exposition of "Basic Considerations :52 the general historic development,
commencing with the proclamation of Florida as a Spanish territory
in 1513 and the various sources of land title to seas and bays, public
rivers and lakes. This is followed by a careful analysis of the "Trust
Theory"5 3 which reexamines the English common law, 54 deals briefly
with the federal common law and turns then to a case by case anal' Against this background,
ysis of "The Trust Theory in Florida."55
the authors set an extensive discussion of Florida's many "Riparian
Acts, ' 5 6 starting with the Riparian Act of 1856 and ending with the
Bulkhead Act of 1957,' 7 to date the most important attempt to
"correct the deficiencies in policy and administration that had existed up to that time." ' The remainder of Chapter 12 is devoted to
problems of changing shorelines by accretion, reliction and avulsion, 59 and "Special Problems with Respect to Fresh-Water Lakes
and Watercourses. ' 60 The wealth of these materials alone, superbly
organized, would support the view that the authors rose fully to
their most difficult task. However, there are additional reasons. One
is the uncompromising candor with which the authors retell the sad
51. Id. at 347, quoting from 1 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights § 36 (1904).
52. Id. § 121.

53. Id. § 122.
54. It concludes, no doubt properly, that prior to Lord Hale's De Jure Marls the
theory that the Crown had title to all beds under tidal waters was unheard of. The
authors concede, as they must, the "tremendous impact" of De Jure Mars and its role
as "the main source of the modern law." Id. at 353.
55. Id. § 122.2.

56. id. § 123.
57. A separate section (§ 125) is devoted to this legislation.
58. Id. at 368.

59. Id. § 126.

60. Id. § 127.
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tale of Florida's "indiscriminate development""' of what may well
be its most precious natural resource, described by one writer as
follows:
Historically, resource efforts were aimed primarily at placing the
state's natural resource heritage in private hands as quickly as possible. . . At one time or another the Trustees6 2 have had under
their control more than 23,000,000 acres of the total 35,000,000
acres of land and water area in the state. By the turn of the century,
all but 3,000,000 acres of this land had passed into the hands of private interests, most of it in the form of lavish grants to railroad
companies. Since that time the Trustees have disposed of almost all
63
of the land remaining in the Fund.
It is little comfort that the essence of this passage is reminiscent
of so much of the history of the federal public domain and, for that
matter, of the history of our dealings with natural resources everywhere. There is comfort, though, small as it may be, in the increasing willingness to abandon the simplistic matrix of "free enterprise
equals great progress" and to face our environmental facts. The
authors' discussion is a contribution to that growing awareness.
A second factor making this chapter outstanding is that it gives
a picture of the contending forces 64-something
which does not
always emerge in the authors' discussion of other areas of water
resources law. But perhaps no other area is as emotion-charged and
thus so susceptible to the formation of strong partisan groups.
Finally, the focus of this chapter is decidedly "environmental."
That is, the narrow legal question, who has title to Blackacre
(Blackacre being bottom land), is put into its larger setting of "the
overall problem of development and management of the state's
water resources" which, in turn, is merely one facet of "the totality
61. Id. at 385.
62. The Trustees referred to are those of the Internal Improvement Fund, a state
agency established in 1855 and charged with primary responsibility for administering
sovereignty bottoms. Id. at 356-57 & n.75.
63. Id. at 357, quoting from DeGrove, Administrative Problems in the Management of Florida's Tidal Lands 20 (Studies in Pub. Admin. No. 18, U. Fla. Pub. Admin.
Clearing Serv., 1959). And see the discussion of the Act of 1951 (Id. § 124). The Act
gave the Trustees title to all sovereignty tidal bottoms (except those in Dade and Palm
Beach Counties) in an attempt to curb the postwar outbreak of bay fills by giving the
Trustees discretion to refuse to sell. No criteria were set forth for the exercise of that
discretion. The authors conclude: "Thus, the Trustees, all elected officials, had little
motivation to change the status quo of easy sales. The administrative agency could not
point to a legislative directive to justify a strong conservation-oriented policy." Id. at
368.
64. See, e.g., id. § 125.5, "Critique of the Bulkhead Act" and § 127.3, "Appraisal
and Recommendations" (regarding the Trustee Management of (fresh-water) Lakes
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of legal, physical and environmental problems" 65 faced by Florida
and the nation.
Chapter 13, "A [brief] Look to the Future," serves as the
authors' vehicle for stating their own views. They do so, cogently
and forcefully, on a number of issues: the need for coordination in
planning, not only between federal and state agencies, state agencies
among themselves, and state and municipal agencies, but between
what they call "scientific and operational levels ;"66 the need for that
dreaded (in some quarters, that is) concept, centralized planning
responsibility; the need for planning on the basis of hydrologic
units; the need for a master plan, for pollution control, for recreation demands, for state-federal cooperation and, finally, for research, both scientific and legal.
In a way, one wishes the authors had given us the benefit of their
own views wherever possible at the time of the substantive discussion. The danger of holding back until the final chapter is that it
may remain unread. If the book will be used primarily as a treatise,
the likelihood is that its user will search out "his" problem without
bothering with the rest. I hope this will not happen. I hope, rather,
he will be lured to take that Look to the Future: it is a thoughtful
catalogue of imperatives and we will ignore it to our peril.
This, then, is the substance of the book or rather, its Florida
part. But before giving any overall assessment, an unpleasant task
remains, namely, to deal with Chapter 8, "Federal Authority and
Activity Affecting Florida's Water Resources." The task is unpleasant because Chapter 8 fails the standard set in the rest of
Water Law and Administration-The FloridaExperience by a considerable margin. Frankly, this is astonishing. The job of bringing
together the appropriate federal materials must have been considerably easier than that of compiling and analyzing Florida law.
There is a relatively extensive "federal literature" ;67 presumably,
65. Id. at 405. As a matter of fact, one of the emerging "environmental law" cases,
Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969), comes from Florida. Zabel is discussed by the authors (at 379) and was, at the time of their writing, pending before
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. In Zabel, the Corps
of Engineers, after conferring with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and
a host of public and private groups (who had lost their case in the Florida supreme
court in Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority, 171 So. 2d
376 (Fla. 1965) refused a filling permit primarily because the dredging and filling
would be harmful to fish and wildlife. The plaintiff's argument is that the Corps may
consider only harm to navigation, not to fish and wildlife. The district court has since
agreed and the Secretary of the Army has appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. See Prospectus for the Environmental Law Reporter app. A (The Public
Law Education Institute, The Conservation Foundation, September 1, 1969).
66. Maloney, supra note 10 at 407.
67. For a non-exhaustive list see 2 Waters & Water Rights 4 n.4 (Clark ed. 1967).
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little or nothing of that sort existed for the Florida materials. No
excuse appears, therefore, for the sins committed in this chapter. To
name a few: the "Introduction and Background" 6 lighthandedly
dismisses the general welfare clause, among others, as being "generally considered of secondary significance, at least as far as water
development and control are concerned." 9 This will come as a surprise to those who thought that federal reclamation activity-hardly
an undertaking of "secondary significance"-has taken place under
70
the general welfare power.
Section 82.1 on "the Meaning of Commerce" stops with Gilman
7' decided in 1865. There is no mention, here, of
v. Philadelphia,
such cases as United States v. Twin City Power Company. 2 Yet
Twin City raised an important question of the "meaning of commerce," namely, do multi-purpose projects which benefit navigation
at best only incidentally nevertheless fall within the permissible
limits of sovereign dealings with navigable waterways under the
rubric "commerce?" The book discusses Twin City for the first time
when it deals with the compensability of private rights vis-t-vis an
exercise of the federal power (the navigation servitude), a second,
albeit important, aspect of the case. Other cases bearing on the
sweep of the power, i.e., on the "meaning of commerce," can be
found in a footnote accompanying this textual statement: "Flood
control and waterway development have been recognized as having
equal importance with the maintenance of navigation as constitutional objectives of Congress. '7 3 The statement is unobjectionable,
except for its presence in a subsection entitled "The New Meaning
of Navigability. ' 74 Analytical clarity would be better served by
sharply separating the question, what is navigable, from the question, for what purposes may the navigation power be exercised.
Similarly, "The New Meaning of Navigability" includes this dis68. Maloney, supra note 10 at § 81.
69. Id. § 222.
70. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). Perhaps the
authors were speaking about the East exclusively. If so, that should have been made
clear. As it is, the statement purports to be a general one.
71. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
72. 350 U.S. 222 (1956). Other relevant cases are United States v. Appalachian
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) ; Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941) ; United
States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960), which upheld flood control
and watershed development projects as constitutionally sanctioned measures of "commerce." See also Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (suit to declare Boulder
Canyon Project Act unconstitutional).
73. Maloney, supra note 10, at 229. Footnote 47 lists, in addition to Oklahoma v.
Atkinson and Appalachian, United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690 (1899) ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53
(1913) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
74. Id. § 82.4.
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cussion of United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Power Company :75
[The case] made it clear that riparian rights of individuals, if
they in any way limited federal control, are subordinated. It should
be noted that the government was willing to give some compensation
for the rights taken in that case, although not nearly as much as
plaintiff asked for. Mr. Justice Burton was willing to concede that
quite possibly some rights might exist in the waters of 7a6 private nonnavigable stream wholly upon the lands of one person.

Aside from the observation that this is an unenlightening discussion
of the case qua case, what does it have to do with "The New
Meaning of Navigability"? Why does it not belong in the next
section, "Federal Authority and Private Rights, ' 77 which deals with
the navigation servitude, although without giving the reader any
real feeling for what the problem is all about ?78
Other examples are at hand: Section 84 purports to examine
"Federal Authority and State Interests," a subject of obvious importance and concern. Yet the brief and superficial discussion of7
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Commission, 9
Arizona v. California,s° (the first case) and Oklahoma v. 4tkinson s* hardly begins to convey the tensions generated by a federal
system so often put under additional stress because of the inability
or unwillingness of the states to assume their share of the burden.
Section 84.2 is entitled "Federal Management of Water Resources," a title which promises more than the bare listing of federal
agencies involved in water resources.
Finally, in turning to "The Federal Role in Florida, '8 2 the
authors quite properly devote attention to the activities of the Corps
75. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
76. Maloney, supra note 10, at 228-29.
77. Id. § 83.
78. Id. § 83.1, "Nonnavigable and Navigable Distinction," concludes that the Court's
position regarding the rights of riparian owners along nonnavigable streams was "confused at best." In this context, footnote 67 asks the reader to compare United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917), with United States v. Chicago, M., S.P. & P.R.R., 312 U.S.
592 (1941) and United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). It then
adds: "See also Munro, The Pelton Decision: .4 New Riparianisml 36 Oregon L. Rev.
221 (1957)," an article dealing with the implications flowing from FPC v. Oregon, 349
U.S. 435 (1955) under the reserved rights doctrine for the public land states. This
reviewer simply cannot imagine what bearing it is supposed to have on the subject
under discussion.
79. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
80. 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
81. 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
82. Maloney, supra note 10, at § 84.3.
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of Engineers.13 Unfortunately, however, the discussion is a paraphrase of (and in places is taken verbatim from) a self-congratulatory pamphlet issued by the Corps. 8 4 Many impartial observers view the Corps as an agency devoted to the single-minded
pursuit of burying under tons of concrete the last remaining streams
which still dare bubble. It would have been desirable, therefore, to
have the authors' appraisal of the Corps' work and not the Corps'.
In short, Chapter 8 is a poor relation to the other twelve chapters.8 5 It is badly organized, not very thoughtful and often careless.
Fortunately, it is not a major part of the book. Thus it does not
impair the work's usefulness, although it does little to enhance it.
Water Law and .4dministration-TheFlorida Experience is a
major contribution to the growing water law literature of the East.
It is highly readable, contains much valuable and useful factual information, and presents a thorough and comprehensive analysis of
Florida law. It occasionally falters86-usually when it tries too hard
to be an eastern treatise. That is not to say and is not meant to say
that its usefulness is limited to Florida courts and lawyers. One
should hope, rather, that it will take its place on the shelves of all to
whom the nation's water problems are a matter of urgent concern.
EVA

H. HANKS*

83. Id. § $4.3(a).
84. See id. at 240 n.102.
85. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the Everglades National Park Problem. It gives a good description of the physical problems of that beleaguered treasure,
briefly presents some of the proposed physical solutions and turns then to the legal
issues. I may be mistaken, but I seem to detect a slight bias in favor of the State of
Florida. Perhaps that is because the authors consider the Park to be "a major asset of
the people of the state" rather than the people of the nation (Id. at 256).
86. Setting aside Chapter 8 where it more than falters.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Rutgers-The State University of New
Jersey.

